Lido Proposes Two-Track MEV Policy for Ethereum ePBS; Vote and Mainnet Activation Remain Ahead

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LIDO · ETHEREUM · MEV POLICY

Lido Proposes Two-Track MEV Policy for Ethereum ePBS; Vote and Mainnet Activation Remain Ahead

Lido’s 4 November proposal would open protocol-guaranteed ePBS bids while retaining an allowlist for trusted payments. A November vote and Ethereum mainnet activation remain ahead.

Purple Ethereum diamond identifying the network whose future block-building rules are addressed by Lido’s MEV proposal
Ethereum icon by GitR0n1n via Wikimedia Commons. Public-domain simple geometric logo; trademark rights may apply. Used for editorial identification and not as evidence of proposal approval.

Lido contributors published an updated maximal extractable value policy proposal on 4 November, seeking to adapt node-operator rules to Ethereum’s planned enshrined proposer-builder separation, or ePBS. The draft preserves competitive block sourcing but divides builder payments into protocol-guaranteed and externally settled tracks.

The proposal is not active policy. Its authors plan a vote in November, and implementation would take effect only after Ethereum’s Glamsterdam upgrade reaches mainnet. No mainnet activation is established by the Lido post. NetNapz has not independently tested client configurations or monitoring systems described in the proposal.

Trustless bids would use an open builder market

Under the proposed trustless track, Lido validators could accept bids from any builder satisfying Ethereum’s in-protocol registration, collateral, signature and payment requirements. These bids would contain no external execution payment; the proposer payment would instead be enforced by Ethereum’s protocol.

Node operators would have to keep peer-to-peer bid reception available on nodes capable of proposing Lido blocks. Direct builder connections or compatible middleware could also carry trustless bids if their external-payment allowance remained at zero. Lido-specific builder approval would not be required for this track.

The proposal would direct attributable rewards to Lido’s execution-layer rewards vault. Validators would broadcast signed proposer preferences naming that vault, and accepted bids would have to use the same fee recipient.

External payments would retain an allowlist

The trusted track covers bids containing payments settled outside Ethereum’s protocol guarantees. Builders or intermediaries offering those payments would need approval through Lido’s Allowed List. The draft retains governance oversight because external settlement creates counterparty and non-payment risk.

Existing relay entries could remain eligible after the transition only if they meet stated compatibility and transparency conditions. These include registered builder identities, public keys, Hoodi testing and public bid or delivered-payload data that Lido monitoring can consume. New applicants would follow the established assessment process.

Monitoring expands with the two-track design

The draft proposes monitoring fee recipients, open-market access, payload sources, external payment delivery and deviations from eligible bid values. Local block building would remain possible within community guidance, but deliberately bypassing higher-value eligible bids could trigger review.

Every production, backup and failover node serving Lido proposals would have to use compliant settings. Distributed validator clusters would apply consistent configuration across members, subject to middleware support. Builder failures would continue through existing incident processes, while client-level safeguards remain under development.

What the proposal does not establish

The publication does not enact the policy, confirm a DAO vote, activate Glamsterdam or demonstrate higher staking returns. It does not guarantee that every builder will participate, that external payments will settle or that monitoring will observe every available bid.

The proposal also concerns validator block-building rules rather than ownership rights in Lido DAO or Ethereum. Holding LDO does not represent ownership of Ethereum validators or builder companies, and the draft supplies no evidence of a token-price response.

NetNapz assessment

NetNapz assessment: the two-track design attempts to use ePBS’s protocol guarantees without treating externally promised payments as equally trustless. That distinction is operationally meaningful: a payment enforced by Ethereum and a payment expected from a builder expose validators to different failure modes.

The policy’s practical value will depend on Ethereum’s final mainnet implementation, client readiness, the quality of Lido’s monitoring and the governance process for trusted builders. The next verifiable milestones are the November vote, a confirmed Glamsterdam mainnet schedule and published operator transition guidance.

Sources and verification limits

NetNapz reviewed the public proposal and existing site coverage. It did not participate in governance, reproduce validator-client settings, audit builder payments or verify a deployed mainnet policy. All implementation statements remain conditional on later governance and Ethereum release evidence.

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